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Abstract 
Although Japanese credit associations are nonprofit cooperative financial institutions, they shoulder 
the same financial functions as regional banks that are stock companies and they could compete with 
each other in a regional market. On the other hand, governance structures of credit associations tend 
to make disciplines be weaker than those of regional banks and their performances might be better 
than regional banks for these reasons. 
In the present paper, we empirically investigated whether the objective functions of credit associations 
are different from those of regional banks with considering the differences of their governance 
structures. As a result, although significant differences of profitability of these two types of institutions 
were not detected, it was also demonstrated that credit associations can capture more share of deposits 
than regional banks and the former are more conservative in risk taking than the latter. From these, 
there is a possibility that Japanese credit associations have different objective functions from regional 
banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Japanese credit associations were established for the purpose of mutual aid among members and are 
one of the nonprofit cooperative financial institutions. However, both credit associations and regional 
banks that are stock companies are classified to regional financial institutions, which are required to 
practice region-based relationship banking by the government, and financial functions that are 
shouldered by them in a region are almost the same. Thus, these two types of institutions could 
compete with each other in a regional market1. However, cooperative financial institutions including 
credit associations have received great preferential treatments such as the benefit in taxation from the 
government, which is different from regional banks. 
In addition, the governance structures of credit associations are largely different from those of private 
banks that are stock companies because the qualifications of investors of them are restricted to regional 
members and voting right at the meetings such as a general meeting of representatives is provided that 
a member has one vote regardless of the amount of investment of a member. It is often pointed out 
that those governance structures of credit associations tend to make disciplines be weaker than those 
of private banks in Japan. 
As we will survey in section 2, Allen and Gale (2000) mentioned while the objectives of commercial 
banks are profit maximization, nonprofit financial institutions that have different governance 
structures, i.e. weaker ones, act to maximize objective functions that incorporate labor expenses in 
ordinary profit function2. Granero and Reboredo (2005) revealed that this applies to Spanish financial 
institutions, and savings banks can capture greater share of deposits and take less risks in their portfolio 
as a result of empirical analysis 3 . When we consider both the governance structures of credit 
associations that tend to be weaker and the benefits they receive from the government as mentioned 
before, it cannot be perfectly denied that they have different objective functions from those of regional 
banks that are stock companies in Japan too. 
Therefor, the purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate whether Japanese credit associations act 
to maximize the objective functions that are different from regional banks. Specifically, we empirically 
investigate the following; (1) Credit associations can obtain greater share of deposits than regional 
banks, (2) The former are more conservative in risk taking than the latter, and (3) The former raise 
higher profits than the latter. 
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain our analytical 
method. In Section 3, the data used in this study are surveyed. In Section 4, we present and discuss 
our empirical results. A summary and conclusion are provided in the final Section. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
Granero and Reboredo (2005) empirically analyzed whether the performances of savings banks and 
                                                   
1 Hesse and Čihák (2007) revealed that in systems with a high presence of cooperative banks, weak 
commercial banks are less stable than they would be. Okuma (2017) concluded that cooperative 
financial institutions were more stable than regional commercial banks during the Global Financial 
Crisis in Japan. 
2 Verbrugge and Jahera (1981), Akella and Greenbaum (1988) and Purroy and Salas (2000) analyzed 
on the expense preference behavior. 
3 García-Marco and Robles-Fernández (2008) examined risk behavior in commercial banks and 
savings banks in Spanish. 
commercial banks in Spain are different, which is based on the theoretical model of Allen and Gale 
(2000). We also follow this theoretical framework. The outlines of it are as follows. 
Bank A and bank B compete each other in a regional market. Bank A is a commercial bank whose 
objective is profit maximization and bank B is a cooperative bank whose corporate and governance 
structure is assumed to yield an organization in between a capitalist entity and a cooperative of workers. 
Bank A maximizes the following expected profit. 
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝(𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴)(𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 − 𝑅𝑅(𝐷𝐷)𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴)         (1) 
 
p(YA) is the profitability that bank A gets return YA, DA is the amount of deposit bank A holds, D is 
the sum of the deposits in a regional market, i.e. D=DA+DB, R(D) is the opportunity cost of funds, w 
is the wage, and LA is the volume of labor of bank A. 
On the other hand, bank B maximizes the following objective function that includes labor expenses in 
equation (1)4. 
 
𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵 = 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 + 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝(𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵)𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵            (2) 
 
θ is the (positive) expense preference parameter. 
From the first-order conditions of equation (1) and (2), the followings can be said5. 
(a) Cooperative financial institutions like bank B can receive more volume of deposits than 
commercial banks like bank A, i.e. DB>DA, and the former are more conservative on investing risk 
assets that the latter, i.e. YA>YB. 
(b) Cooperative financial institutions can obtain higher expected payoff level, i.e. UB>πA. 
(c) When the expense preference parameter is not too large, expected profits of cooperative financial 
institutions are higher than those of commercial banks. 
In the present paper, the following three equations are estimated as in Granero and Reboredo (2005) 
to test whether above from (a) to (c) are applied to Japanese regional financial institutions. 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐2𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (3) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐2𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (4) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐2𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖              (5) 
                                                   
4 Fonteyne (2007) mentioned that a cooperative bank might resemble a worker cooperative rather than 
a consumer cooperative. 
5 See Granero and Reboredo (2005) in detail. 
 Subscript i refers to i financial institution, and subscript t refers to year t. Deposit means whether a 
financial institution can obtain large amount of deposit and is calculated by dividing deposit by total 
asset. Risk is a proxy variable on the aggressiveness of financial institution’s risk taking and two 
measures are used. Risk1 is calculated by dividing loans and bills discounted by total asset and Risk2 
is calculated by dividing stock by total asset. Profit is a profitability and ROA and ROE are used. ROA 
is calculated by dividing current term net profit by total asset and ROE is calculated by dividing current 
term net profit by total net asset6. 
Dummy is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when i financial institution is a credit association, 
while the dummy variable takes a value of 0 when it is a regional bank. Asset is a total asset and is a 
proxy for financial institution size. Asset is converted into a natural logarithm. 
If objective functions of credit associations are different from those of regional banks and from (a) to 
(c) are applied to Japan too, the coefficients of Dummy in equation (3) and (5) will take positive signs 
and those in equation (4) will take negative signs. 
 
 
3. Data 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of estimation models from (3) to 
(5), which are separated into credit associations and regional banks. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The mean of Deposit of credit associations is about 4% larger than regional banks. Credit associations 
can capture more share of deposits. Both of the mean of Risk1 and that of Risk2 of credit associations 
is about 20% for the former and is about 1.15% for the latter less than those of regional banks. In both 
lending and stock investment, it can be said that credit associations are more conservative in risk taking. 
The mean of ROA and that of ROE of credit associations is about 0.02 for the former and is about 0.2 
for the latter larger than those of regional banks. In both ROA and ROE, credit associations can realize 
higher profitability although their differences are not too large. That is, when focusing on the means, 
all of the Deposit, Risk, and Profit satisfy from (a) to (c) in the former section. These will be tested by 
regression analyses in the next section. 
The data used in the present paper are derived from Nikkei Needs. Data absent from Nikkei Needs 
were supplemented by “Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks,” edited by the Japanese 
Bankers Association, and by “Financial Statements of All Credit Associations,” edited by the 
Consultant of Financial Books Co., Ltd. 
                                                   
6 Average balances are used as the total asset in the denominators. 
  
4. Estimation Result 
In this section, we discuss the estimation results for equations from (3) to (5). The estimation results 
for equations (3) and (4) are presented in Table 2. Standard errors are calculated as White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. 
 
     Table 2. Estimation Results for Deposit and Risk 
 
In the estimation results for Deposit, all of the coefficients of Dummy take significantly positive signs 
at the 1% levels. The fact that credit associations can gather more share of deposits than regional banks 
is also found here, which is the same tendency as in the means shown in the previous section. 
In addition, in the estimation results for Risk1 and Risk2, the coefficients of Dummy take significantly 
negative signs at the 1% levels in all cases. In both lending and stock investment, credit associations 
take less risks than regional banks. These are also consistent with the tendency of the means observed 
in the previous section7. 
Next, the estimation results for equation (5) are shown in Table 3. These standard errors are also White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. 
 
     Table 3. Estimation Results for Profit 
 
In both of the estimation results for ROA and ROE, all of the coefficients of Dummy take positive signs 
but are insignificant. Although the tendencies that credit associations can raise a little larger 
profitability than regional banks were found on both of the mean of ROA and that of ROE in the 
previous section, significant differences are not detected here. Profit margins of interest rate have 
become much smaller due to the ultra-low interest rate policies taken by Bank of Japan for a long time. 
Therefore, profit rates of financial institutions have been lower as a whole and the differences of them 
among financial institutions have become smaller. It might be the reason for these results. 
From these, although significant differences are not observed in profitability, it can be revealed that 
credit associations can receive deposits easier than regional banks and the former are more 
conservative in risk taking than the latter, which are consistent with theoretical predictions in Section 
2. Thus, there is a possibility that Japanese credit associations also have the objective functions as in 
equation (2), which are different from those of regional banks, due to the special characteristics of 
                                                   
7 When we use cash and due from banks as a proxy for the degree of risk avoidance instead of Risk, 
the coefficients of it take significantly positive signs at the 1% level. It can be said that credit 
associations are more conservative in risk taking from these too. 
their governance structures. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Japanese cooperative financial institutions shoulder almost the same financial functions as regional 
banks in a region and they could compete with each other. On the other hand, the former are institutions 
for mutual aid among members and whose governance structures tend to make disciplines be weaker 
than those of regional banks8. Thus, there is a possibility that objective functions of them are different. 
In the present paper, we pick up Japanese credit associations and empirically investigate whether the 
objective functions of them are different from the ordinary profit function. 
Although the means of profit rates of credit associations are a little larger than those of regional banks, 
significant differences could not be detected by the regression analyses. This might reflect that the 
differences of profitability among financial institutions have been small due to the ultra-low interest 
rate policies that have been taken in Japan for a long time. 
On the other hand, it was also revealed that credit associations can capture more share of deposits than 
regional banks and the former take less risks than the latter. These two points are consistent with 
theoretical predictions in the case that we assume that credit associations and regional banks have 
different objective functions. 
Judging from these, there is a possibility that Japanese credit associations tend to maximize the 
objective functions that incorporate labor expenses in profit function as is demonstrated in foreign 
previous studies9. If governances of credit associations become stronger than now, objective functions 
of them will be nearing those of regional banks and the benefits that credit associations can enjoy, 
which were revealed in the present paper, might be weaker. It might be necessary to reconsider what 
the governance structures of credit associations should be like as they and regional banks could 
compete with each other and they receive preferential treatments such as in taxation, which are 
different from regional banks. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Regional Banks      
Deposit 840 88.343  6.211  68.835  187.691  
Risk1 840 65.497  7.881  45.412  131.773  
Risk2 832 1.575  1.010  0.092  7.757  
ROA 840 0.211  0.192  -1.619  1.097  
ROE 840 4.120  4.795  -42.752  24.276  
Credit Associations      
Deposit 2,147 92.390  2.975  52.683  98.099  
Risk1 2,147 45.658  9.161  6.384  72.614  
Risk2 2,147 0.417  1.247  0.001  21.656  
ROA 2,147 0.235  3.652  -3.829  168.811  
ROE 2,147 4.342  80.193  -109.077  3703.356  
 
Table 2. Estimation Results for Deposit and Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Deposit Deposit Risk1 Risk1 Risk2 Risk2 
              
Dummy 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (7.183) (7.176) (-39.920) (-39.915) (-11.443) (-11.401) 
Asset -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-8.093) (-8.099) (-0.777) (-0.786) (5.437) (5.433) 
ROA -0.000  -0.000  0.000  
 (-0.633)  (-0.459)  (0.467)  
ROE  0.000  0.000**  -0.000** 
  (0.215)  (2.531)  (-2.117) 
Constant 1.001*** 1.001*** 0.676*** 0.676*** -0.004 -0.004 
 (64.681) (64.672) (24.936) (24.937) (-1.146) (-1.155) 
       
Observations 2,987 2,987 2,987 2,987 2,979 2,979 
R-squared 0.189 0.189 0.506 0.506 0.171 0.171 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Table 3. Estimation Results for Profit 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ROA ROE 
      
Dummy 0.176 3.427 
 (1.190) (1.053) 
Asset 0.078** 1.633** 
 (2.186) (2.092) 
Constant -0.924* -19.756* 
 (-1.779) (-1.730) 
   
Observations 2,987 2,987 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
